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Ash
Ash, Solicitor
Category: Law
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Experience:  Solicitor with 5+ years experience
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There, I took out a small claim against Landrover over

Resolved Question:

Hello There, I took out a small claim against Landrover over head gasket failure in my car. The Car is known to have a fault but I was only given evidence in a report made by Landrover that proved that all models of this car were flawed and would suffer head gasket failure. The head gasket failure was over 6 years ago, but the car had to be repaired again under warranty a year later, so I believed because they had to work on the car within the 6 year limitation I would be ok, I also only received the evidence last year and I thought that section 14 of the Limitation act which says that it is when you hear of evidence after the incident that a further 6 years is granted.
So in light of the above I filed in the small claim system for £961 repairs paid to LR in 2008 and Depreciation as the car had to be scraped, the whole of my claim after interest was under £4,000 - perfect for a small claim.
While I believed I was safe in taking on a giant of industry thru the small claims system, land rover applied to strike out the case claiming it was over 6 years . I attended the strike out claim and gave the judge my evidence, The Judge agreed with them, stated the evidence being only know later was invalid , disregarded the head gasket failing within its years warranty which meant that the car was given replacement parts again within 6 years.
The judge also said that because I was at a previous trial where someone suing land rover for the same issue, who gave me the evidence I needed after the the trial (2014) - He lost his case because he was over 6 year with the claim and had the evidence for over 6 years) That I will have to pay the LR solicitors costs. The was reduced from £13,000 to £10,000 including vat, which was rounded up to £10,000 when no vat was required ( even here I said that £10,000 including vat was £8,000 and he should therefore state that costs should be £8,000 and not £1000 but he kept it to £10,000).
Is the above fair? I thought the small claims was supposed to protect parties from the other sides legal bills, and if I filled in a small claims form for my claim how can I then be told that this is not.
At the previous trial the LR solicitors tried to claim over £20,000 legal costs and the judge stated that you cannot claim legal fees in the small claim system. They consequently could not claim the £20,000. Here it has happened to me
Can I challenge this £10,000 bill?
Submitted: 2 years ago.
Category: Law
Expert:  Ash replied 2 years ago.
Alex Watts :

Hello my name is ***** ***** i will help you with this.

Alex Watts :

For now please let me know whether it was allocated to the small claim BEFORE the strike out application>

Customer:

Hello Alex,

Customer:

I applied for the small claim court and it was not allocated before the strike out claim

Customer:

PS I then receive small claim documents titled : Notice of proposed allocation to the small claims track

Alex Watts :

Ok - they were represented I assume?

Alex Watts :

On what basis did the Court say they were entitled to costs? Was it on an indemnity basis?

Customer:

I am not sure, their argument was that because I had witnessed someone else with a similar claim and they warned me of their cost, ( though mine was different as I only received the evidence last year and I thought because of the 2nd repair in warranty within 6 yrs would make my case different and win) to which I replied I was within the small claim system and the could not claim their costs against me if I lost...

Alex Watts :

Well that is not quite right, as the matter was not yet allocated to the small claims track

Alex Watts :

It was proposed, not actually allocated.

Customer:

But I applied on line and stated I wanted to use the small claim system!

Alex Watts :

However under the court rules they are only entitled to limited costs.

Alex Watts :

Under CPR 45 Table 2

Alex Watts :

Where summary judgment is given under Part 24 or the court strikes out a defence under rule 3.4(2)(a), in either case, on application by a party

Alex Watts :

They are entitled to costs of ONLY £175 or £210 where the claim exceeds £5,000

Customer:

So how limited is limited?

Alex Watts :

So either way you would only be required to pay £175 or £210

Alex Watts :

You can therefore appeal on this basis.

Alex Watts :

Please see the Court rules at:

Alex Watts :

https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part45-fixed-costs

Alex Watts :

Can I clarify anything for you about this today please?

Customer:

Ok so why has the judge order £10,000 with out knowing this clause????

Alex Watts :

I do not know that. But the court rules say they are only entitled to fixed costs.

Alex Watts :

The Judge got it wrong and you can appeal on this basis

Customer:

Are you 100% sure on this?

Alex Watts :

Yes.

Alex Watts :

Look at the rules yourself.

Alex Watts :

The Judge has a discretion to allow higher costs if a party has acted improperly which is why I asked if costs were awarded on the indemnity basis

Alex Watts :

Does that clarify?

Customer:

Ok , this is undertanably good news, now can I ask if the judge was right to dis allow the 5years because the car had to be re-repaied in warranty? Or because I was only given evidence that would enable me to take action 1 year ago?

Alex Watts :

That is a different argument. You can only really appeal the costs point. You had another set of proceedings so that was potentially an abuse if they had already been dealt with.

Customer:

I do not understand?

Alex Watts :

Your main point is on costs. The Judge thought that you had no case.

Alex Watts :

Therefore your main point is to argue costs.

Alex Watts :

To claim against the Judges discretion against your claim is very difficult.

Alex Watts :

But you could also seek to appeal on that point too

Alex Watts :

Your main appeal point is the costs though

Customer:

But I am asking you if the judge was right on striking out because of re-repair or evidence being supplied a year ago? It is no point appealing if he is right… can you see if I am right please?

Alex Watts :

The Limitation Act is 6 years from the date the breach occurred, not from when you had knowledge of it. That only applies to negligence which has a 3 year limitation period

Customer:

But it was negligence and I only verbally found out in 2012 and was given the evidence last year!

Alex Watts :

Ok, if it is negligence your claim then you sound like you may have a claim in that.

Customer:

I quoted section 14 of the limitation act but they claimed another section of the limitation act which the judge went with..

Alex Watts :

Ok, then that is another point of appeal.

Alex Watts :

But if you use THAT as a point of appeal and lose you would have to pay THEIR costs of appeal

Alex Watts :

So you may just want to limit it to the issue of costs

Customer:

I canon appeal with out evidence which I am hoping you can provide! Is there any infer on a repair under warranty having to be re-repaierd and consequently winning extra time in a time related case?

Alex Watts :

I do not understand?

Alex Watts :

I can't provide evidence for you, its your case!

Alex Watts :

I am only saying the law

Alex Watts :

You have a costs argument.

Alex Watts :

You have a Limitation argument. If the Judge got limitation wrong then you can appeal on that basis

Alex Watts :

Does that clarify?

Customer:

I have asked you 3 questions and you have only answer 1 succinctly, I and asking you that if the car was repaid and then a year later while still under warranty it is repaired then surely this extra year extension should be considered against the 6 year maximum time, DO YOU HAVE EXAMPLES IN YOU LAW BOOKS OF PEOPLE WINNING BECAUSE OF THIS? IE the re-repair extended the 6 year limit???

Alex Watts :

1) No, this is not an extra year extension to the 6 year time limit.

Alex Watts :

The time runs from date of purchase. If they repaired it during that period then the 6 years does not run again.

Alex Watts :

The 6 years runs from the original date of purchase.

Alex Watts :

The law of limitation runs from the POINT OF CONTRACT, ie purchase date. NOT when it was repaired.

Alex Watts :

I am sorry if this is not the answer you want and certainly not the one I want to give you, but I have a duty to be honest

Customer:

Ok thank you, ***** ***** clarify on the £10,000 demand they simply cannot ask this only the maximum of £210 - I still do not understand why the lawyers did not know this or the judge??????

Alex Watts :

If costs had been awarded in the indemnity basis then the Judge has discretion to award more.

Alex Watts :

But usually the Judge has to award the fixed costs according to the rules.

Alex Watts :

Otherwise there would be no point having fixed costs

Alex Watts :

Does that help?

Customer:

I do not understand what you mean by indemnity basis ,,, can you explain this in lay tens for a simpleton?

Customer:

PS lay terms for a simpleton

Alex Watts :

Ok. If you had acted improperly then the Judge can give higher costs.

Alex Watts :

But generally the Court sticks to the fixed costs rules.

Alex Watts :

Is that easier to understand?

Customer:

Have I acted improperly by making a claim knowing that someone else had lost in a similar case but they had the evidence for over 6 years but I had it for only 1 year - are they arguing I have incurred solicitors costs from repeating this in a similar way?

Alex Watts :

I do not think so no.

Alex Watts :

Which is why I think you can appeal the costs argument

Customer:

What if the LR solicitors warn me of costs and suggest I back off?

Alex Watts :

Its a matter for you. I think you have a reasonable shot at an appeal

Customer:

IE ors this mean the 210 limit is now no longer valid??

Customer:

It is not a matter for me to know, I need you knowledge on this, do the have the right to quash the limited 210 if they warn me of costs and not to proceed?

Alex Watts :

No the £210 is valid unless the Judge said you had acted improperly.

Alex Watts :

We have already discussed that I did not think you had

Alex Watts :

But if you lose the appeal you would be liable for the costs of the other side. That is always the risk

Alex Watts :

If you win the appeal they will be liable for your costs

Customer:

He never said I acted improperly, but he said because I was at a previous trial I should pay the costs

Alex Watts :

Ok. Then it should be limited to £210 in costs.

Alex Watts :

So you have grounds to appeal

Customer:

Ok, I hope you are right, it did should very surreal to use the small claim system and come home with a crippling bill of £10000!

Alex Watts :

I can imagine. Which is why costs are usually fixed.

Alex Watts :

Can I clarify anything else for you?

Customer:

Well I was hoping you could clarify why the judge ignores my section 14.10 clause of the limitation act which extends the time limit if the evidence only comes to light

Customer:

come to light at a later date

Alex Watts :

Negligence is limitation for 3 years. Contract is 6 years. Only in negligence can limitation be extended ie by date of knowledge.

Alex Watts :

You said you are claiming for negligence but for 6 years. Sadly that is wrong.

Alex Watts :

You can only claim 3 years for negligence from date of knowledge and 6 years for contract from date of breach.

Alex Watts :

Does that make sense?

Customer:

Ok so the car is repaired in 2008 and I am told of the evidence in 2012 and given it in 2014 so 2008 + 6 yrs is 2012 + 3 yrs is 2015?????

Alex Watts :

No.

Alex Watts :

Breach of contract would be 6 years from 2008

Alex Watts :

You are saying the product is defective.

Alex Watts :

This is not negligence.

Customer:

But why is evidence not known at time ( limitations act 14.10) not extending that by 3 years

Customer:

I have evidence from land rover that the engine was floored and they kew this in 1998 and continued to sell the car with this engine in it costing misery for owners out of warranty 68,000 engine failures in 1998!

Customer:

That is negligence

Alex Watts :

WHAT SECTION ARE YOU SAYING LAND ROVER RELIED ON IN THEIR COURT CASE?

Alex Watts :

And on what basis did the Judge find for Land Rover?

Customer:

They say the pri***** *****mitation period for a negligence claim expired in or around april 2014 ( sec 2 of limitation act.)

Customer:

But 14.10 of act says if evidence was not know at time of incident (2008) the evidence later extends by 3 yrs

Alex Watts :

Section 14A(10) Does not actually says its extends the period by 3 years.

Customer:

they say limitation period for a claim in negligence expired on 7th june 2014 (if not before) pursuant to section 14a of the limitation act

Alex Watts :

It says:

Alex Watts :

(10)For the purposes of this section a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—


(a)from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or


(b)from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek;


but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.

Customer:




(9)Knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (5) above.



(10)For the purposes of this section a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—



(a)from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or



(b)from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek;


but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.



14BOverriding time limit for negligence actions not involving personal injuries.



(1)An action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of this Act applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of fifteen years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or omission—



(a)which is alleged to constitute negligence; and



(b)to which the damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged to be attributable (in whole or in part).



(2)This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) above applies notwithstanding that—



(a)the cause of action has not yet accrued; or



(b)where section 14A of this Act applies to the action, the date which is for the purposes of that section the starting date for reckoning the period mentioned in subsection (4)(b) of that section has not yet occurred;


before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.]


Actions to recover land and rent



15Time limit for actions to recover land.



(1)No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.



(2)Subject to the following provisions of this section, where—



(a)the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and the right of action to recover the land accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest; and



(b)the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest (not being a term of years absolute) was not in possession of the land on that date;


no action shall be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest or six years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, whichever period last expires.



(3)Subsection (2) above shall not apply to any estate or interest which falls into possession on the determination of an entailed interest and which might have been barred by the person entitled to the entailed interest.



(4)No person shall bring an action to recover any estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom he claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest, unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought such an action.



(5)Where any person is entitled to any estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to any future estate or interest in that land, and his right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Act, no action shall be brought by that person, or by any person claiming through him, in respect of the future estate or interest, unless in the meantime possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.



(6)Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act contains provisions for determining the date of accrual of rights of action to recover land in the cases there mentioned.



(7)Part II of that Schedule contains provisions modifying the provisions of this section in their application to actions brought by, or by a person claiming through, the Crown or any spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)





16Time limit for redemption actions.


When a mortgagee of land has been in possession of any of the mortgaged land for a period of twelve years, no action to redeem the land of which the mortgagee has been so in possession shall be brought after the end of that period by the mortgagor or any person claiming through him.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C10S. 16 excluded (13.10.2003) by 2002 c. 9, ss. 96(2), 136(2) (with s. 129); S.I. 2003/1725, art. 2





17Extinction of title to land after expiration of time limit.


Subject to—



(a)section 18 of this Act;F9. . .



(b)F9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


at the expiration of the period prescribed by this Act for any person to bring an action to recover land (including a redemption action) the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.




Amendments (Textual)



F9S. 17(b) and the word immediately preceding repealed (13.10.2003) by 2002 c. 9, ss. 135, 136(2), Sch. 13 (with s. 129, Sch. 12 para. 1); byS.I. 2003/1725, art. 2



Modifications etc. (not altering text)





18Settled land and land held on trust.



(1)Subject to section 21(1) and (2) of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply to equitable interests in land F10. . . as they apply to legal estates.


Accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Act but not otherwise, be treated as accruing to a person entitled in possession to such an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances, and on the same date, as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in the land (and any relevant provision of Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act shall apply in any such case accordingly).



(2)Where the period prescribed by this Act has expired for the bringing of an action to recover land by a tenant for life or a statutory owner of settled land—



(a)his legal estate shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land either has not accrued or has not been barred by this Act; and



(b)the legal estate shall accordingly remain vested in the tenant for life or statutory owner and shall devolve in accordance with the M8Settled Land Act 1925;


but if and when every such right of action has been barred by this Act, his legal estate shall be extinguished.



(3)Where any land is held upon trust F10. . . and the period prescribed by this Act has expired for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustees, the estate of the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land F10. . . either has not accrued or has not been barred by this Act; but if and when every such right of action has been so barred the estate of the trustees shall be extinguished.



(4)Where—



(a)any settled land is vested in a statutory owner; or



(b)any land is held upon trust F10. . .;


an action to recover the land may be brought by the statutory owner or trustees on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in possession in the land F10. . . whose right of action has not been barred by this Act, notwithstanding that the right of action of the statutory owner or trustees would apart from this provision have been barred by this Act.




Amendments (Textual)



Marginal Citations





19Time limit for actions to recover rent.


No action shall be brought, or distress made, to recover arrears of rent, or damages in respect of arrears of rent, after the expiration of six years from the date on which the arrears became due.


[F11Commonhold]




Amendments (Textual)



F11S. 19A and cross-heading inserted (27.9.2004) by 2002 c. 15, ss. 68, 181(1), Sch. 5 para. 4; S.I. 2004/1832, art. 2





[F1219AActions for breach of commonhold duty


An action in respect of a right or duty of a kind referred to in section 37(1) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (enforcement) shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.]




Amendments (Textual)



F12S. 19A and cross heading inserted (27.9.2004) by 2002 c. 15, ss. 68, 181(1), Sch. 5 para. 4; S.I. 2004/1832, art. 2




Actions to recover money secured by a mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land



20Time limit for actions to recover money secured by a mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land.



(1)No action shall be brought to recover—



(a)any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property (whether real or personal); or



(b)proceeds of the sale of land;


after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to receive the money accrued.



(2)No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued.


But if the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property after that date, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not be treated as having accrued for the purposes of this subsection until the date on which his possession discontinued.



(3)The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be treated as accruing so long as that property comprises any future interest or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined.



(4)Nothing in this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Act relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action.



(5)Subject to subsections (6) and (7) below, no action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.



(6)Where—



(a)a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of the property charged; and



(b)an action is brought within one year of the discontinuance of that possession by the subsequent incumbrancer;


the subsequent incumbrancer may recover by that action all the arrears of interest which fell due during the period of possession by the prior incumbrancer or damages in respect of those arrears, notwithstanding that the period exceeded six years.



(7)Where—



(a)the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises any future interest or life insurance policy; and



(b)it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest shall be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge;


interest shall not be treated as becoming due before the right to recover the principal sum of money has accrued or is treated as having accrued.


Actions in respect of trust property or the personal estate of deceased persons



21Time limit for actions in respect of trust property.



(1)No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—



(a)in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or



(b)to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.



(2)Where a trustee who is also a beneficiary under the trust receives or retains trust property or its proceeds as his share on a distribution of trust property under the trust, his liability in any action brought by virtue of subsection (1)(b) above to recover that property or its proceeds after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for bringing an action to recover trust property shall be limited to the excess over his proper share.


This subsection only applies if the trustee acted honestly and reasonably in making the distribution



(3)Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued.


For the purposes of this subsection, the right of action shall not be treated as having accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.



(4)No beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Act shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action and this Act had been pleaded in defence.



22Time limit for actions claiming personal estate of a deceased person.


Subject to section 21(1) and (2) of this Act—



(a)no action in respect of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in any such estate (whether under a will or on intestacy) shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to receive the share or interest accrued; and



(b)no action to recover arrears of interest in respect of any legacy, or damages in respect of such arrears, shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.


Actions for an account



23Time limit in respect of actions for an account.


An action for an account shall not be brought after the expiration of any time limit under this Act which is applicable to the claim which is the basis of the duty to account.


Miscellaneous and supplemental



24Time limit for actions to enforce judgments.



(1)An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of six years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable.



(2)No arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.



F1325Time limit for actions to enforce advowsons and extinction of title to advowsons.



(1)No person shall bring an action to enforce a right to present to or bestow any ecclesiastical benefice as patron of that benefice after the expiration of whichever of the following periods last expires, that is to say—



(a)a period during which three clerks in succession have held the benefice adversely to the right of presentation or gift of the person in question (or of some person through whom he claims); or



(b)a period of sixty years during which the benefice has been held adversely to that right;


and in no case after the expiration of a period of one hundred years during which the benefice has been held adversely to that right or to the right of some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest or an undivided share or alternate right of presentation or gift held or derived under the same title.


This subsection shall apply to the Crown or a bishop claiming a right to present to or bestow any ecclesiastical benefice as patron, but shall not affect the right of the Crown or a bishop to present or collate to any ecclesiastical benefice by reason of a lapse.



(2)Where any benefice becomes void after being held adversely to the right of presentation or gift of the patron of the benefice and a clerk is presented or collated to the benefice by Her Majesty or the ordinary—



(a)the possession of that clerk shall be treated as adverse; but



(b)where the benefice is avoided in consequence of the incumbent being made a bishop, the incumbency of the new clerk shall, for the purpose of subsection (1)(a) above, be treated as a continuation of the prior incumbency.



(3)Subject to section 75 of the M9Land Registration Act 1925, at the expiration of the period prescribed by this Act for any person to bring an action to enforce an advowson the title of that person to the advowson shall be extinguished. F13




Amendments (Textual)



F13S. 25 repealed (provinces of Canterbury and York) (1.1.1989) by Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 (No. 3, SIF 21:4), ss. 1(2), 4(3), 42(2)



Marginal Citations





26Administration to date back to death.


For the purposes of the provisions of this Act relating to actions for the recovery of land and advowsons an administrator of the estate of a deceased person shall be treated as claiming as if there had been no interval of time between the death of the deceased person and the grant of the letters of administration.



27Cure of defective disentailing assurance.



(1)This section applies where—



(a)a person entitled in remainder to an entailed interest in any land makes an assurance of his interest which fails to bar the issue in tail or the estates and interests taking effect on the determination of the entailed interest, or fails to bar those estates and interests only; and



(b)any person takes possession of the land by virtue of the assurance.



(2)If the person taking possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, or any other person whatsoever (other than a person entitled to possession by virtue of the settlement) is in possession of the land for a period of twelve years from the commencement of the time when the assurance could have operated as an effective bar, the assurance shall thereupon operate, and be treated as having always operated, to bar the issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect on the determination of the entailed interest.



(3)The reference in subsection (2) above to the time when the assurance could have operated as an effective bar is a reference to the time at which the assurance, if it had then been executed by the person entitled to the entailed interest, would have operated, without the consent of any other person, to bar the issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect on the determination of the entailed interest.



[F1427AActions for recovery of property obtained through unlawful conduct etc.



(1)None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of proceeds of unlawful conduct).



(2)Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of twelve years from the date on which the [F15relevant person's] cause of action accrued.



(3)Proceedings under that Chapter are brought when—



(a)a claim form is issued, or



[F16(aa)an application is made for a property freezing order, or]



(b)an application is made for an interim receiving order,


whichever is the [F17earliest].



(4)The [F18relevant person's] cause of action accrues in respect of any recoverable property—



(a)in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of property obtained through unlawful conduct, when the property is so obtained,



(b)in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of any other recoverable property, when the property obtained through unlawful conduct which it represents is so obtained.



(5)If—



(a)a person would (but for the preceding provisions of this Act) have a cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel, and



(b)proceedings are started under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of the chattel,


section 3(2) of this Act does not prevent his asserting on an application under section 281 of that Act that the property belongs to him, or the court making a declaration in his favour under that section.



(6)If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.



(7)Expressions used in this section and Part 5 of that Act have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.



[F19(8)In this section “relevant person” means—



(a)the Serious Organised Crime Agency,



(b)the Director of Public Prosecutions,



(c)the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, or



(d)the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.]]




[F2027BActions for recovery of property for purposes of an external order



(1)None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (civil proceedings for the realisation of property to give effect to an external order).



(2)Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of twelve years from the date on which the [F21relevant person's] cause of action accrued.



(3)Proceedings under that Chapter are brought when—



(a)a claim form is issued, or



(b)an application is made for a property freezing order, or



(c)an application is made for an interim receiving order,


whichever is earliest.



(4)The [F21relevant person's] cause of action accrues in respect of any recoverable property—



(a)in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of property obtained, or believed to have been obtained, as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct, when the property is so obtained,



(b)in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of any other recoverable property, when the property obtained, or believed to have been obtained, as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct which it represents is so obtained.



(5)If—



(a)a person would (but for the preceding provisions of this Act) have a cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel, and



(b)proceedings are started under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of the chattel,



(c)section 3(2) of this Act does not prevent his asserting on an application under article 192 of that Order that the property belongs to him, or the court making a declaration in his favour under that article.



(6)If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.



(7)In this section—



(a)“criminal conduct” is to be construed in accordance with section 447(8) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and



(b)expressions used in this section which are also used in Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.



[F22(8)In this section “relevant person” means—



(a)the Serious Organised Crime Agency,



(b)the Director of Public Prosecutions,



(c)the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, or



(d)the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.]]




Part IIExtension or Exclusion of Ordinary Time Limits


Disability



28Extension of limitation period in case of disability.



(1)Subject to the following provisions of this section, if on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.



(2)This section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims.



(3)When a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under a disability, no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person.



(4)No action to recover land or money charged on land shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of thirty years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims.



[F23(4A)If the action is one to which section 4A of this Act applies, subsection (1) above shall have effect—



(a)in the case of an action for libel or slander, as if for the words from “at any time” to “occurred)” there were substituted the words “by him at any time before the expiration of one year from the date on which he ceased to be under a disability”; and



(b)in the case of an action for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood, as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “one year”.]



(5)If the action is one to which section 10 of this Act applies, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “two years”.



(6)If the action is one to which section 11 or 12(2) of this Act applies, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “three years”.



[F24(7)If the action is one to which section 11A of this Act applies or one by virtue of section 6(1)(a) of the M10Consumer Protection Act 1987 (death caused by defective product), subsection (1) above—



(a)shall not apply to the time limit prescribed by subsection (3) of the said section 11A or to that time limit as applied by virtue of section 12(1) of this Act; and



(b)in relation to any other time limit prescribed by this Act shall have effect as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “three years”.]




Amendments (Textual)



F23S. 28(4A) (which was inserted by 1985 c. 61, ss. 57(3), 69(5), Sch. 9 para. 14) substituted (4.9.1996) by 1996 c. 31, ss. 5(3)(6), 19 (with s. 20(2))




Modifications etc. (not altering text)




Marginal Citations





[F2528AExtension for cases where the limitation period is the period under section 14A(4)(b).



(1)Subject to subsection (2) below, if in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by section 14A of this Act—



(a)the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) of that section is the period mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection;



(b)on the date which is for the purposes of that section the starting date for reckoning that period the person by reference to whose knowledge that date fell to be determined under subsection (5) of that section was under a disability; and



(c)section 28 of this Act does not apply to the action;


the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of three years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period mentioned above has expired.



(2)An action may not be brought by virtue of subsection (1) above after the end of the period of limitation prescribed by section 14B of this Act.]



Acknowledgment and part payment



29Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment.



(1)Subsections (2) and (3) below apply where any right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or an advowson or any right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property has accrued.



(2)If the person in possession of the land, benefice or personal property in question acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued—



(a)the right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment; and



(b)in the case of a right of action to recover land which has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest taking effect on the determination of an entailed interest against whom time is running under section 27 of this Act, section 27 shall thereupon cease to apply to the land.



(3)In the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee, if the person in possession of the land, benefice or personal property in question or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect of the debt (whether of principal or interest) the right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the payment.



(4)Where a mortgagee is by virtue of the mortgage in possession of any mortgaged land and either—



(a)receives any sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage debt; or



(b)acknowledges the title of the mortgagor, or his equity ofredemption;


an action to redeem the land in his possession may be brought at any time before the expiration of twelve years from the date of the payment or acknowledgment.



(5)Subject to subsection (6) below, where any right of action has accrued to recover—



(a)any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim; or



(b)any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in any such estate;


and the person liable or accountable for the claim acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect of it the right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or payment.



(6)A payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but any payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt.



(7)Subject to subsection (6) above, a current period of limitation may be repeatedly extended under this section by further acknowledgments or payments, but a right of action, once barred by this Act, shall not be revived by any subsequent acknowledgment or payment.



30Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments.



(1)To be effective for the purposes of section 29 of this Act, an acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person making it.



(2)For the purposes of section 29, any acknowledgment or payment—



(a)may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section; and



(b)shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.



31Effect of acknowledgment or part payment on persons other than the maker or recipient.



(1)An acknowledgment of the title to any land, benefice, or mortgaged personalty by any person in possession of it shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.



(2)A payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or any other person liable for the debt, or by any person in possession of the mortgaged property, shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.



(3)Where two or more mortgagees are by virtue of the mortgage in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of his equity of redemption by one of the mortgagees shall only bind him and his successors and shall not bind any other mortgagee or his successors.



(4)Where in a case within subsection (3) above the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to any ascertained part of the mortgage debt the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment, with interest, of the part of the mortgage debt which bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the whole of the mortgaged land.



(5)Where there are two or more mortgagors, and the title or equity of redemption of one of the mortgagors is acknowledged as mentioned above in this section, the acknowledgment shall be treated as having been made to all the mortgagors.



(6)An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person.



(7)A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect of the debt or claim.



(8)An acknowledgment by one of several personal representatives of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in any such estate, or a payment by one of several personal representatives in respect of any such claim, shall bind the estate of the deceased person.



(9)In this section “successor”, in relation to any mortgagee or person liable in respect of any debt or claim, means his personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve (whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise).


Fraud, concealment and mistake



32Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake.



(1)Subject to [F26subsection (3)][F26subsections (3) and (4A)] below, where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either—



(a)the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or



(b)any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or



(c)the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake;


the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.


References in this subsection to the defendant include references to the defendant’s agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent.



(2)For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.



(3)Nothing in this section shall enable any action—



(a)to recover, or recover the value of, any property; or



(b)to enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property;


to be brought against the purchaser of the property or any person claiming through him in any case where the property has been purchased for valuable consideration by an innocent third party since the fraud or concealment or (as the case may be) the transaction in which the mistake was made took place.



(4)A purchaser is an innocent third party for the purposes of this section—



(a)in the case of fraud or concealment of any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action, if he was not a party to the fraud or (as the case may be) to the concealment of that fact and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the fraud or concealment had taken place; and



(b)in the case of mistake, if he did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.



[F27(4A)Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to the time limit prescribed by section 11A(3) of this Act or in relation to that time limit as applied by virtue of section 12(1) of this Act.]



[F28(5)Sections 14A and 14B of this Act shall not apply to any action to which subsection (1)(b) above applies (and accordingly the period of limitation referred to in that subsection, in any case to which either of those sections would otherwise apply, is the period applicable under section 2 of this Act).]




Amendments (Textual)



F26Words “subsections (3) and (4A)” substituted (1.3.1988) for words “subsection (3)” by Consumer Protection Act 1987 (c. 43, SIF 109:1), ss. 6(6), 50(2), Sch. 1 para. 5(a)





Modifications etc. (not altering text)




C15S. 32(1)(c) excluded (22.7.2004 with effect as mentioned in s. 320(1) of the amending act) by Finance Act 2004 (c. 12), s. 320


S. 32(1)(c) excluded (19.7.2007) by Finance Act 2007 (c. 11), s. 107




[F29Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions for defamation or malicious falsehood




Amendments (Textual)



F29Cross heading and s. 32A (which were inserted by 1985 c. 61, ss. 57(4), 69(5), Sch. 9 para. 14) substituted (4.9.1996) by 1996 c. 31, ss. 5(4)(6), 19(2) (with s. 20(2))





F3032ADiscretionary exclusion of time limit for actions for defamation or malicious falsehood.



(1)If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which—



(a)the operation of section 4A of this Act prejudices the plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and



(b)any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents,


the court may direct that that section shall not apply to the action or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.



(2)In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—



(a)the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;



(b)where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of action did not become known to the plaintiff until after the end of the period mentioned in section 4A—



(i)the date on which any such facts did become known to him, and



(ii)the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action; and



(c)the extent to which, having regard to the delay, relevant evidence is likely—



(i)to be unavailable, or



(ii)to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the period mentioned in section 4A.



(3)In the case of an action for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood brought by a personal representative—



(a)the references in subsection (2) above to the plaintiff shall be construed as including the deceased person to whom the cause of action accrued and any previous personal representative of that person; and



(b)nothing in section 28(3) of this Act shall be construed as affecting the court’s discretion under this section.



(4)In this section “the court” means the court in which the action has been brought.]




Amendments (Textual)



F30S. 32A (which was inserted by 1985 c. 61, ss. 57(4), 69(5), Sch. 9 para. 14) substituted (4.9.1996) by 1996 c. 31, ss. 5(4)(6), 19(2) (with s. 20(2))




Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries or death



33Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries or death.



(1)If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which—



(a)the provisions of section 11 [F31or 11A] or 12 of this Act prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and



(b)any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents;


the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.



[F32(1A)The court shall not under this section disapply—



(a)subsection (3) of section 11A; or



(b)where the damages claimed by the plaintiff are confined to damages for loss of or damage to any property, any other provision in its application to an action by virtue of Part I of the M11Consumer Protection Act 1987.]



(2)The court shall not under this section disapply section 12(1) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 11 [F33or subsection (4) of section 11A].


If, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the M12Fatal Accidents Act 1976 because of the time limit in Article 29 in Schedule 1 to the M13Carriage by Air Act 1961, the court has no power to direct that section 12(1) shall not apply.



(3)In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—



(a)the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;



(b)the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 11[F34, by section 11A] or (as the case may be) by section 12;



(c)the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant;



(d)the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;



(e)the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;



(f)the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received.



(4)In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 11 [F33or subsection (4) of section 11A], he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased.



(5)In a case under subsection (4) above, or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on the date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) above shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit.



(6)A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 12(1) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 1(1) of the M14Fatal Accidents Act 1976.



(7)In this section “the court” means the court in which the action has been brought.



(8)References in this section to section 11 [F35or 11A] include references to that section as extended by any of the preceding provisions of this Part of this Act or by any provision of Part III of this Act.




Part IIIMiscellaneous and General



F3634. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




35New claims in pending actions: rules of court.



(1)For the purposes of this Act, any new claim made in the course of any action shall be deemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced—



(a)in the case of a new claim made in or by way of third party proceedings, on the date on which those proceedings were commenced; and



(b)in the case of any other new claim, on the same date as the original action.



(2)In this section a new claim means any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim, and any claim involving either—



(a)the addition or substitution of a new cause of action; or



(b)the addition or substitution of a new party;


and “third party proceedings” means any proceedings brought in the course of any action by any party to the action against a person not previously a party to the action, other than proceedings brought by joining any such person as defendant to any claim already made in the original action by the party bringing the proceedings.



(3)Except as provided by section 33 of this Act or by rules of court, neither the High Court nor any county court shall allow a new claim within subsection (1)(b) above, other than an original set-off or counterclaim, to be made in the course of any action after the expiry of any time limit under this Act which would affect a new action to enforce that claim.


For the purposes of this subsection, a claim is an original set-off or an original counterclaim if it is a claim made by way of set-off or (as the case may be) by way of counterclaim by a party who has not previously made any claim in the action.



(4)Rules of court may provide for allowing a new claim to which subsection (3) above applies to be made as there mentioned, but only if the conditions specified in subsection (5) below are satisfied, and subject to any further restrictions the rules may impose.



(5)The conditions referred to in subsection (4) above are the following—



(a)in the case of a claim involving a new cause of action, if the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as are already in issue on any claim previously made in the original action; and



(b)in the case of a claim involving a new party, if the addition or substitution of the new party is necessary for the determination of the original action.



(6)The addition or substitution of a new party shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (5)(b) above as necessary for the determination of the original action unless either—



(a)the new party is substituted for a party whose name was given in any claim made in the original action in mistake for the new party’s name; or



(b)any claim already made in the original action cannot be maintained by or against an existing party unless the new party is joined or substituted as plaintiff or defendant in that action.



(7)Subject to subsection (4) above, rules of court may provide for allowing a party to any action to claim relief in a new capacity in respect of a new cause of action notwithstanding that he had no title to make that claim at the date of the commencement of the action.


This subsection shall not be taken as prejudicing the power of rules of court to provide for allowing a party to claim relief in a new capacity without adding or substituting a new cause of action.



(8)Subsections (3) to (7) above shall apply in relation to a new claim made in the course of third party proceedings as if those proceedings were the original action, and subject to such other modifications as may be prescribed by rules of court in any case or class of case.



F37(9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




Amendments (Textual)



Modifications etc. (not altering text)




C17S. 35(5)(a) modified (22.7.2004 with effect as mentioned in s. 320(2) of the ammended act) by Finance Act 2004 (c. 12), s. 320





36Equitable jurisdiction and remedies.



(1)The following time limits under this Act, that is to say—



(a)the time limit under section 2 for actions founded on tort;



[F38(aa)the time limit under section 4A for actions for libel or slander, or for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood;]



(b)the time limit under section 5 for actions founded on simple contract;



(c)the time limit under section 7 for actions to enforce awards where the submission is not by an instrument under seal;



(d)the time limit under section 8 for actions on a specialty;



(e)the time limit under section 9 for actions to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment; and



(f)the time limit under section 24 for actions to enforce a judgment;


shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief, except in so far as any such time limit may be applied by the court by analogy in like manner as the corresponding time limit under any enactment repealed by the M15Limitation Act 1939 was applied before 1st July 1940.



(2)Nothing in this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise.




Amendments (Textual)



F38S. 36(1)(aa) (which was inserted by 1985 c. 61, ss. 57(5), 69(5), Sch. 9 para. 14) substituted (4.9.1996) by 1996 c. 31, ss. 5(5)(6), 19 (withs. 20(2))



Marginal Citations





37Application to the Crown and the Duke of Cornwall.



(1)Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, and without prejudice to section 39, this Act shall apply to proceedings by or against the Crown in like manner as it applies to proceedings between subjects.



(2)Notwithstanding subsection (1) above, this Act shall not apply to—



(a)any proceedings by the Crown for the recovery of any tax or duty or interest on any tax or duty;



(b)any forfeiture proceedings under the customs and excise Acts (within the meaning of the M16Customs and Excise Management Act 1979); or



(c)any proceedings in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.


In this subsection “duty” includes any debt due to Her Majesty under section 16 of the Tithe M17Act 1936, and “ship” includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars.



(3)For the purposes of this section, proceedings by or against the Crown include—



(a)proceedings by or against Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;



(b)proceedings by or against any Government department or any officer of the Crown as such or any person acting on behalf of the Crown; and



(c)proceedings by or against the Duke of Cornwall.



(4)For the purpose of the provisions of this Act relating to actions for the recovery of land and advowsons, references to the Crown shall include references to Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster; and those provisions shall apply to lands and advowsons forming part of the possessions of the Duchy of Cornwall as if for the references to the Crown there were substituted references to the Duke of Cornwall as defined in the M18Duchy of Cornwall Management Act 1863.



(5)For the purposes of this Act a proceeding by petition of right (in any case where any such proceeding lies, by virtue of any saving in section 40 of the M19Crown Proceedings Act 1947, notwithstanding the general abolition by that Act of proceedings by way of petition of right) shall be treated as being commenced on the date on which the petition is presented.



(6)Nothing in this Act shall affect the prerogative right of Her Majesty (whether in right of the Crown or of the Duchy of Lancaster) or of the Duke of Cornwall to any gold or silver mine.




38Interpretation.



(1)In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—




  • “action” includes any proceeding in a court of law, including an ecclesiastical court;




  • “land” includes corporeal hereditaments, tithes and rent-charges and any legal or equitable estate or interest thereinF39. . . but except as provided above in this definition does not include any incorporeal hereditament;




  • “personal estate” and “personal property” do not include chattels real;




  • “personal injuries” includes any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition, and “injury” and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly;




  • “rent” includes a rentcharge and a rentservice;




  • “rentcharge” means any annuity or periodical sum of money charged upon or payable out of land, except a rent service or interest on a mortgage on land;




  • “settled land”, “statutory owner” and “tenant for life” have the same meanings respectively as in the M20Settled Land Act 1925;




  • “trust” and “trustee” have the same meanings respectively as in the M21Trustee Act 1925; and




  • F40. . .





(2)For the purposes of this Act a person shall be treated as under a disability while he is an infant, or [F41lacks capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to conduct legal proceedings].



(3)F42. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



(4)F42. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



(5)Subject to subsection (6) below, a person shall be treated as claiming through another person if he became entitled by, through, under, or by the act of that other person to the right claimed, and any person whose estate or interest might have been barred by a person entitled to an entailed interest in possession shall be treated as claiming through the person so entitled.



(6)A person becoming entitled to any estate or interest by virtue of a special power of appointment shall not be treated as claiming through the appointor.



(7)References in this Act to a right of action to recover land shall include references to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the case of rentcharges and tithes, to distrain for arrears of rent or tithe, and references to the bringing of such an action shall include references to the making of such an entry or distress.



(8)References in this Act to the possession of land shall, in the case of tithes and rentcharges, be construed as references to the receipt of the tithe or rent, and references to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land shall, in the case of rent charges, be construed as references to the date of the last receipt of rent.



(9)References in Part II of this Act to a right of action shall include references to—



(a)a cause of action;



(b)a right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on any property;



(c)a right to recover proceeds of the sale of land; and



(d)a right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person.



(10)References in Part II to the date of the accrual of a right of action shall be construed—



(a)in the case of an action upon a judgment, as references to the date on which the judgment became enforceable; and



(b)in the case of an action to recover arrears of rent or interest, or damages in respect of arrears of rent or interest, as references to the date on which the rent or interest became due.




Amendments (Textual)



F39Words in the definition of "land" repealed (1.1.1997) by 1996 c. 47, s. 25(2), Sch. 4 (with ss. 24(2), 25(4)(5)); S.I. 1996/2974, art. 2




F40Definition of "trust for sale" repealed (1.1.1997) by 1996 c. 47, s. 25(2), Sch. 4 (with ss. 24(2), 25(4)(5)); S.I. 1996/2974, art. 2





Marginal Citations






39Saving for other limitation enactments.


This Act shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) or to any action or arbitration to which the Crown is a party and for which, if it were between subjects, a period of limitation would be prescribed by or under any such other enactment.



40Transitional provisions, amendments and repeals.



(1)Schedule 2 to this Act, which contains transitional provisions, shall have effect.



(2)The enactments specified in Schedule 3 to this Act shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in that Schedule, being amendments consequential on the provisions of this Act; but the amendment of any enactment by that Schedule shall not be taken as prejudicing the operation of section 17(2) of the M22Interpretation Act 1978 (effect of repeals).



X1(3)The enactments specified in Schedule 4 to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in column 3 of that Schedule.




Editorial Information



X1The text of s. 40(3) is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991



Marginal Citations





41Short title, commencement and extent.



(1)This Act may be cited as the Limitation Act 1980.



(2)This Act, except section 35, shall come into force on 1st May 1981.



(3)Section 35 of this Act shall come into force on 1st May 1981 to the extent (if any) that the section substituted for section 28 of the M23Limitation Act 1939 by section 8 of the M24Limitation Amendment Act 1980 is in force immediately before that date; but otherwise section 35 shall come into force on such day as the Lord Chancellor may by order made by statutory instrument appoint, and different days may be appointed for different purposes of that section (including its application in relation to different courts or proceedings).



(4)The repeal by this Act of section 14(1) of the M25Limitation Act 1963 and the corresponding saving in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to this Act shall extend to Northern Ireland, but otherwise this Act does not extend to Scotland or to Northern Ireland.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C18Power of appointment conferred by s. 41(3) fully exercised: 1.5.1981 appointed by S.I. 1981/588, art. 2



Marginal Citations






SCHEDULES

Section 15(6) (7).


SCHEDULE 1Provisions with Respect to Actions to Recover Land



Part IAccrual of Rights of Action to Recover Land


Accrual of right of action in case of present interests in land


1Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession of the land, and has while entitled to the land been dispossessed or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.


2Where any person brings an action to recover any land of a deceased person (whether under a will or on intestacy) and the deceased person—



(a)was on the date of his death in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect upon his death, in possession of the land charged; and



(b)was the last person entitled to the land to be in possession of it;


the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of his death.


3Where any person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to him, or to some person through whom he claims, and—



(a)the person making the assurance was on the date when the assurance took effect in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land charged; and



(b)no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance;


the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date when the assurance took effect.


Accrual of right of action in case of future interests


4The right of action to recover any land shall, in a case where—



(a)the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest; and



(b)no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or interest claimed;


be treated as having accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest.



5(1)Subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, a tenancy from year to year or other period, without a lease in writing, shall for the purposes of this Act be treated as being determined at the expiration of the first year or other period; and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be treated as having accrued at the date on which in accordance with this sub-paragraph the tenancy is determined.



(2)Where any rent has subsequently been received in respect of the tenancy, the right of action shall be treated as having accrued on the date of the last receipt of rent.



6(1)Where—



(a)any person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by which a rent of not less than ten pounds a year is reserved; and



(b)the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease; and



(c)no rent is subsequently received by the person rightfully so entitled;


the right of action to recover the land of the person rightfully so entitled shall be treated as having accrued on the date when the rent was first received by the person wrongfully claiming to be so entitled and not on the date of the determination of the lease.



(2)Sub-paragraph (1) above shall not apply to any lease granted by the Crown.


Accrual of right of action in case of forfeiture or breach of condition



7(1)Subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, a right of action to recover land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of condition shall be treated as having accrued on the date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken.



(2)If any such right has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest in reversion or remainder and the land was not recovered by virtue of that right, the right of action to recover the land shall not be treated as having accrued to that person until his estate or interest fell into possession, as if no such forfeiture or breach of condition had occurred.


Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession



8(1)No right of action to recover land shall be treated as accruing unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (referred to below in this paragraph as “adverse possession”); and where under the preceding provisions of this Schedule any such right of action is treated as accruing on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be treated as accruing unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.



(2)Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and after its accrual, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be treated as having accrued and no fresh right of action shall be treated as accruing unless and until the land is again taken into adverse possession.



(3)For the purposes of this paragraph—



(a)possession of any land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be treated as adverse possession of the rentcharge; and



(b)receipt of rent under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease shall be treated as adverse possession of the land.



(4)For the purpose of determining whether a person occupying any land is in adverse possession of the land it shall not be assumed by implication of law that his occupation is by permission of the person entitled to the land merely by virtue of the fact that his occupation is not inconsistent with the latter’s present or future enjoyment of the land.


This provision shall not be taken as prejudicing a finding to the effect that a person’s occupation of any land is by implied permission of the person entitled to the land in any case where such a finding is justified on the actual facts of the case.


Possession of beneficiary not adverse to others interested in settled land or land held on trust for sale


9Where any settled land or any land [F43subject to a trust of land] is in the possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land F44. . . (not being a person solely or absolutely entitled to the land F44. . .), no right of action to recover the land shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as accruing during that possession to any person in whom the land is vested as tenant for life, statutory owner or trustee, or to any other person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land F44. . ..




Amendments (Textual)



F43Words in Sch. 1 para. 9 substituted (1.1.1997) by 1996 c. 47, s. 25(1), Sch. 3 para. 18 (with ss. 24(2),25(4)(5)); S.I. 1996/2974, art. 2






Part IIModification of Section 15 where Crown or Certain Corporations Sole are involved


10Subject to paragraph 11 below, section 15(1) of this Act shall apply to the bringing of an action to recover any land by the Crown or by any spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole with the substitution for the reference to twelve years of a reference to thirty years.



11(1)An action to recover foreshore may be brought by the Crown at any time before the expiration of sixty years from the date mentioned in section 15(1) of this Act.



(2)Where any right of action to recover land which has ceased to be foreshore but remains in the ownership of the Crown accrued when the land was foreshore, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of—



(a)sixty years from the date of accrual of the right of action; or



(b)thirty years from the date when the land ceased to be foreshore;


whichever period first expires.



(3)In this paragraph “foreshore” means the shore and bed of the sea and of any tidal water, below the line of the medium high tide between the spring tides and the neap tides.


12Notwithstanding section 15(1) of this Act, where in the case of any action brought by a person other than the Crown or a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole the right of action first accrued to the Crown or any such corporation sole through whom the person in question claims, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of—



(a)the period during which the action could have been brought by the Crown or the corporation sole; or



(b)twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the Crown or the corporation sole;


whichever period first expires.


13Section 15(2) of this Act shall apply in any case where the Crown or a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole is entitled to the succeeding estate or interest with the substitution—



(a)for the reference to twelve years of a reference to thirty years; and



(b)for the reference to six years of a reference to twelve years.



Section 40(1).


SCHEDULE 2Transitional Provisions


1Nothing in this Act shall affect the operation of section 4 of the M26Limitation Act 1963, as it had effect immediately before 1 January 1979 (being the date on which the M27Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 came in to force), in relation to any case where the damage in question occurred before that date.



2The amendment made by section 14(1) of the Limitation Act 1963 in section 5 of the M28Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 (which provides that section 5 shall have effect as if for the words “in force in Northern Ireland at the date of the passing of this Act” there were substituted the words “ for the time being in force in Northern Ireland ”) shall continue to have effect notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of section 14(1).



3It is hereby declared that a decision taken at any time by a court to grant, or not to grant, leave under Part I of the Limitation Act 1963 (which, so far as it related to leave, was repealed by the M29Limitation Act 1975) does not affect the determination of any question in proceedings under any provision of this Act which corresponds to a provision of the Limitation Act 1975, but in such proceedings account may be taken of evidence admitted in proceedings under Part I of the Limitation Act 1963.




4(1)In section 33(6) of this Act the reference to section 1(1) of the M30Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be construed as including a reference to section 1 of the M31Fatal Accidents Act 1846.



(2)Any other reference in that section, or in section 12 or 13 of this Act, to the M32Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be construed as including a reference to the M33Fatal Accidents Act 1846.



5Notwithstanding anything in section 29(7) of this Act or in the repeals made by this Act, the M34Limitation Act 1939 shall continue to have effect in relation to any acknowledgment or payment made before the coming into force of section 6 of the M35Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which amended section 23 of the Limitation Act 1939 and made certain repeals in sections 23 and 25 of that Act so as to prevent the revival by acknowledgment or part payment of a right of action barred by that Act) as it had effect immediately before section 6 came into force.



6Section 28 of the Limitation Act 1939 (provisions as to set-off or counterclaim) shall continue to apply (as originally enacted) to any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim made in an action to which section 35 of this Act does not apply, but as if the reference in section 28 to that Act were a reference to this Act; and, in relation to any such action, references in this Act to section 35 of this Act shall be construed as references to section 28 as it applies by virtue of this paragraph.


7Section 37(2)(c) of this Act shall be treated for the purposes of the M36Hovercraft Act 1968 as if it were contained in an Act passed before that Act.



8In relation to a lease granted before the coming into force of section 3(2) of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which substituted “ten pounds a year” for “ twenty shillings ” in section 9(3) of the Limitation Act 1939), paragraph 6(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to this Act shall have effect as if for the words “ten pounds a year” there were substituted the words “ twenty shillings ”.



9(1)Nothing in any provision of this Act shall—



(a)enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; or



(b)affect any action or arbitration commenced before that date or the title to any property which is the subject of any such action or arbitration.



(2)In sub-paragraph (1) above “the relevant date” means—



(a)in relation to section 35 of this Act, the date on which that section comes into force in relation to actions of the description in question or, if section 8 of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which substituted the provisions reproduced in section 35 for section 28 of the Limitation Act 1939) is in force immediately before 1st May 1981 in relation to actions of that description, the date on which section 8 came into force in relation to actions of that description; and



(b)in relation to any other provision of this Act, 1st August 1980 (being the date of coming into force of the remaining provisions of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980, apart from section 8).



Section 40(2)


SCHEDULE 3Consequential Amendments


F451. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



2In section 21A of the M37Administration of Estates Act 1925 (debtor who becomes creditor’s executor by representation or administrator to account for debt to estate) the reference in subsection (2) to theM38Limitation Act 1939 shall be construed as including a reference to this Act.



3In section 2(1) of the M39 Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 (interpretation), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” in the definition of “statute of limitation” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C19The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




4In section 3(4) of the M40 Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954 (application of section 31(2) to (4) of the Limitation Act 1939 for purposes of that section), for the words “Subsections (2) to (4) of section thirty-one of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ Subsections (2) to (6) of section thirty-one of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C20The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




5In section 5(3) of the M41 Carriage by Air Act 1961 (application of time limit in that Act to arbitrations), for the words “section twenty-seven of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ section thirty-four of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C21The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




6In section 7(2)(a) of the M42 Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 (appliction of time limit in that Act to arbitrations), for the words “section 27 of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ section 34 of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C22The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




7In paragraph 7(6) of Schedule 3 to the M43 Agriculture Act 1967 (conditions applying to amalgamated agricultural units) for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C23The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




8In paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 3 to the M44 Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 (time limits for claims for compensation under that Act to be treated as if contained in Part I of the Limitation Act 1939), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C24The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




9In section 25(5) of the M45 Law of Property Act 1969 (accrual of cause of action to recover compensation for loss due to undisclosed land charges), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C25The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




10In section 10 of the M46 Animals Act 1971 (application of certain enactments to liability under sections 2 to 4 of that Act) for the words “the Limitation Acts 1939 to 1963” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C26The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




11In section 2(4) of the M47 Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act 1972 (civil liability under that Act) for the words from “the Limitation Acts 1939 and 1963” to “1954” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C27The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations




12In section 88(4) of the M48 Control of Pollution Act 1974 (civil liability under that Act) for paragraph (c) there shall be substituted the following paragraph—



“(c)the Limitation Act 1980”.




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C28The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.



Marginal Citations





Section 40(3).


SCHEDULE 4Enactments Repealed




Modifications etc. (not altering text)



C29The text of Sch. 3 paras. 1, 3–12, Sch. 4 is in the form in which it was originally enacted: it was not reproduced in Statutes in Force and does not reflect any amendments or repeals which may have been made prior to 1.2.1991.











































































ChapterShort titleExtent of Repeal
2 & 3 Geo. 6 c. 21.The Limitation Act 1939.The whole Act.
7 & 8 Eliz. 2 c. 72.The Mental Health Act 1959.In Schedule 7, Part I, the entry relating to the Limitation Act 1939.
1963 c. 47.The Limitation Act 1963.Sections 4 and 5.
Section 7(7).
Section 14(1).
Sections 15 and 16.
1975 c. 54.The Limitation Act 1975.The whole Act.
1976 c. 30.The Fatal Accidents Act 1976.In Schedule 1, paragraph 3.
1978 c. 47.The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.In Schedule 1, paragraph 6.
1980 c. 24.The Limitation Amendment Act 1980.Sections 1 to 9.
Sections 11 to 13.
Section 14(2) to (4).
Schedules 1 and 2.






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Customer:

Sorry I only meant to past the first 2 inches!!!!

Alex Watts :

So the car was repaired in 2008, is that right?

Customer:

yes, and prior to this before I purchased it land rover customer care said it would have no head gasket issues!

Alex Watts :

Ok, so it was repaired in 2008. Therefore I think on that basis it is not latent damage. If it had not been repaired then I think you may have had a claim under negligence. If you are saying they did not repair it properly then it is breach of contract in any event.

Alex Watts :

I think by saying it applies to this case, you are stretching it somewhat.

Alex Watts :

The problem you have is this - the Judge agreed with the other side.

Alex Watts :

That is the Judges discretion.

Alex Watts :

You would have to show that the Judge got it SO VERY WRONG that no other reasonable Judge could have made the same decision

Alex Watts :

Whilst I think there is some merit in what you say, you run the real risk of losing the appeal on this basis.

Alex Watts :

That means you could be subject to ANOTHER £10,000 in costs awards.

Alex Watts :

Therefore it may be wise to limit your appeal to the issue of costs.

Alex Watts :

If you appeal and lose, then those fixed costs do not apply as it is an appeal.

Customer:

Ok so if I went with the limitation 14.10 as my ammo then I believed I was acting in good faith, certain to win so the judge cannot make me pay £10,000 for wasting their time….correct?

Alex Watts :

The fixed costs limit only applied to a small claim in the first instance.

Alex Watts :

It would not apply with this appeal.

Alex Watts :

You are correct in your reasoning

Alex Watts :

Can I clarify anything else for you?

Customer:

I agre I will only limit my appeal to costs but I need concrete proof that the judge is not allowed to do this very surprising act, by rights if I have applied and paid for the small court service that cannot over ride this and impose £10000 can the… but because they did I am worried it will stick!

Customer:

erratum they cannot over ride this and impose £10000 can they… but because they did I am worried it will stick!

Alex Watts :

Yes of course you are worried. That is why I said the Judge can only impose these costs if he thought you acted improper.

Customer:

Well if improper is believing my evidence is correct and not statue barred, and I submitted my evidence and acted polietyl in the court then I should be ok,

Alex Watts :

I think you should be OK too

Alex Watts :

Can I clarify anything else for you?

Customer:

Sorry that was back to front, I believer I have NOT been improper and that they cannot call my lodging a claim with the evidence of section 14.10 being enough to question which way it should go is enough to ignore the LR solicitors warning me of paying costs to which I replied there are no cost for othe repartees legal fees in the small claim system - which they do not reply to...

Alex Watts :

I agree, I thought you were not improper

Customer:

Ok.

Alex Watts :

They should be fixed costs £210

Customer:

Ok on the strength of that thank you.

Alex Watts :

Great. If this does answer the question can I ask you to rate my answer before you go today, the button should be at the bottom

Alex Watts :

If you need more help please click reply

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